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1.  INTRODUCTION
Insurance always involves risk transfer, which according to Rejda (2005: 21-22) 
means that a pure risk is transferred from the insured to the insurer, who typically 
is in a stronger financial position to pay the loss than the insured. Thus, insurers 
can better manage pure risks than individual insureds due to the application 
of central limit theorem and the law of large numbers. However, in reality the 
possibility that real losses will deviate from expected is very probable, especially if 
there are positive correlations among risks in insurer’s portfolio, as it is in the case 
with catastrophic events (OECD, 2005). In order to protect themselves from these 
deviations insurance companies, in addition to the reserve formation, can raise 
additional equity or debt capital and/or apply mechanisms of transferring risks to 
other carriers. Thus, in insurance risk management the main dilemmas, related 
to the aim of achieving optimal level of risk management, are to determine the 
level of risk that will be retained and the level of risk that will be transferred and 
which risk transfer solutions will be applied. As is shown in Figure 1, with regard 
to the first dilemma, the optimal level is achieved when retentions are established 
at a given total reinsurance price (price of risk transfer) so that the remaining 
variance cannot be further reduced by transferring more risk (Schmitter, 2003: 
13). 
Figure 1:  Insurance risk management costs optimisation
After having made decision on optimal risk retention and transfer level, insurance 
companies need to decide which risk transfer method or combination of them 
will be used in order to further contribute to the optimisation of the total costs of 
insurance risk management. In this regard we should know that the risk transfer 
mechanism utilised by insurance companies for centuries has been reinsurance. RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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However, due to many factors, among which the most important has been the 
capacity shortage of the global insurance and reinsurance industry1, the search 
for  alternatives  of  transferring  the  unbearable  excess  of  insurance  risks  has 
begun. The logical approach in obtaining additional risk transfer capacity was 
to search for the possibilities of utilisation of large volumes of capital that are 
available at capital markets.2 As a result of the innovations in insurance risk 
transfer, insurance companies can now diversify their exposure, reduce the cost 
of capital and expand the availability of insurance by transferring insurance risks 
not only to reinsurers but also to capital markets investors. Numerous studies 
(see for example, McGhee, C. et al., 2008, Global risks (2008), Klein and Mooney 
(2008) and Cummins (2008)) indicate that although still modest in relation to 
traditional  reinsurance,  the  use  of  insurance-linked  securities  is  broadening 
and now can be considered as mainstream rather than alternative risk transfer 
solutions.
Despite the fact that nowadays global insurance companies have the ability to use 
traditional and/or alternative risk transfer solutions, in order to optimise their 
risk transfer programs, the insurance companies in Serbia have only traditional 
solutions at their disposal. However, it is reasonable to expect that capital market 
solutions will be also developed and applied by Serbian insurance companies in 
the future. In order to facilitate this development and to improve the effectiveness 
of  traditional  solutions,  it  is  important  to  understand  the  mechanisms  of 
currently available risk transfer solutions globally and their potential benefits and 
drawbacks. That is the rationale behind the fact why during the conceptualisation 
we decided to firstly explore risk transfer solutions that are available to global 
insurance companies and to determine if these solutions are mutually exclusive or 
complementary to each other and then to briefly describe the current practices of 
domestic insurance companies, in regard to application of risk transfer solutions, 
and to explain our opinion of their desirable future development in Serbia.
1  The capacity shortage has been provoked by increased frequency and severity of catastrophic 
events. The first event that marked the beginning of the new era in insurance risk transfer was 
Hurricane Andrew that caused $23.654 million of insured losses indexed to 2007 (Enz, R., 
et. al. (2008), ‘Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2007: high losses in Europe’, 
Sigma No. 1, Swiss Re, Zurich, p. 40)
2  Capital markets are far more liquid and much more capital is available than on insurance and 
reinsurance market. For example, according to BIS (2008) the notional amount of derivatives 
outstanding at the end of 2007 was around $677 trillion, much more than the reinsurance 
industry’s total capital of around $238 billion, measured as the sum of aggregate shareholders’ 
funds of the 30 leading reinsurance groups and subordinated debt (Benfield Group (2008), 
Global Reinsurance Market Review: Changing the Game, London).60
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2.  THE ROLE OF REINSURANCE IN INSURANCE RISK TRANSFER
In order to hedge portfolios of insurance risks that exceed their retention levels 
insurance companies traditionally use reinsurance. Essentially, reinsurance is 
insurance protection purchased by insurance companies. Although some forms 
of reinsurance existed before3, the modern reinsurance started to develop from 
1846, when Cologne Re was established as the first professional reinsurance 
company. Since then, reinsurance has the role of insurance risk reduction for 
insurance companies, especially for the catastrophic risks. Although through 
reinsurance insurance companies transfer insurance risks, which they initially 
assumed  from  their  insureds,  there  is  no  contractual  relationship  between 
insureds and reinsurers. The need for reinsurance grew out from catastrophic 
events, as was Hamburg fire of 1842, but due to the increased frequency and 
severity of loss events4 it was found that even the capacity of reinsurance market 
is not enough. The reinsurers found solution in additional risk spreading through 
the retrocession market. The mechanism of risk transfer through insurance, 
reinsurance and retrocession is shown by Figure 2.
3  The oldest known trace of reinsurance existence is found in marine policy issued in Genoa in 
1370. That policy covered the shipment of goods from Genoa to Sluys and the most dangerous 
portion of the shipment trip, from Cadiz to Sluys, was reinsured (Herrmannsdorfer, F. (1926), 
Bedeutung und Technik der Rückversicherung, Verlag von Piloty & Loehle, München,p. 332).
4  The increased frequency and severity of loss events are especially emphasised in the last 
several decades due to the factors such as global warming, globalisation and accelerated rate 
of economic development. For example, the number of human-made catastrophes worldwide 
has  risen  from  around  60  in  1970  to  nearly  250  in  2005,  while  the  number  of  natural 
catastrophes over the same period has risen from around 30 to nearly 150. (Zanetti, A. and 
S. Schwarz (2006), ‘Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters 2005: high earthquake 
casualties, new dimension in windstorm losses’, Sigma No 2, Swiss Re, Zurich). Another 
researches suggest the increased severity of catastrophes as possibility that future Hurricanes 
impacting the Northeast USA and Florida could create losses of $20b and $75b, respectively, 
a California earthquake or continental European windstorm could lead to losses of $50b to 
$100b, an 8.5 magnitude earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone of the central USA 
could create $100b of losses, and a repeat of the devastating 1923 Tokyo Earthquake in today’s 
market could lead to losses of $500b to $1t. (Banks, 2005: 10).RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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Figure 2:    The mechanism of risk transfer through insurance,  
reinsurance and retrocession
As is shown in Figure 2, the risk transfer can be accomplished through direct 
or indirect relationships between contracting parties. Its path starts with the 
insureds that transfer life or non-life insurance risks and accompanying premiums 
through  insurance  market  to  insurers.  If  insurance  company  does  not  have 
enough capacity to retain the total risk it transfer the total risk exposure or the 
certain percentage of it, and accompanying premium, to one or several reinsurers 
in the process called cession. For some exceptionally large risks, such as risks in 
marine or aviation insurance, reinsurers transfer risks to other reinsurers5 in the 
process called retrocession. If the loss event occurs, from own financial resources 
insurer will compensate insured for the financial losses, but if that loss event or 
its share was reinsured and later retroceded, retrocessionaire will compensate 
reinsurer who will then compensate insurer in the same proportion as was the 
proportion of initially transferred risk and premium.
The explained risk transfer mechanism is universal but many different types 
of  reinsurance  coverage  exist.  The  two  basic  types  of  reinsurance  contracts 
are facultative agreements, which are intended to cover individual risks6, and 
5  Although in the Figure 3 the term retrocessionaire is used, there are no companies that 
specialise in retrocession business alone. This term is used to describe the function of the 
reinsurer who assumes the risk and receives the accompanying premium while reinsurer who 
transfers risk and premium is called retrocedant.
6  They are basically separate reinsurance agreements negotiated for each insurance policy that 
insurance company wishes to reinsure.62
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treaty agreements, which are intended to cover portfolios of risks. Both types 
of reinsurance agreements can be in proportional, which means that reinsurer 
takes a determined share of risk for the same share of premium and when a loss 
occurs it is indemnified in that same proportion, or non-proportional form of 
reinsurance cover, which means that the reinsurer indemnifies the ceding insurer 
only for losses that are in excess of cedant’s retention, subject to the reinsurance 
upper limit.7 
Although  there  are  numerous  types  of  reinsurance  cover,  all  of  them  have 
the same major aim of reducing risk in insurer’s portfolio, or in other words, 
the purchase of reinsurance can substitute for capital and allow an insurer to 
hold less capital without increasing its insolvency probability (Harrington and 
Niehaus, 2004: 89). In the same way as insurance reduce the standard deviation 
of real claims from expected, reinsurance by pooling of risks of different insurers 
reduce the standard deviations of claims costs for each of them. If we assume that 
expected claims costs for insurer are equal to μ and his assets are equal to μ+x 
and hence the capital is equal to x, then the reinsurance will lower the probability 
of insolvency from the area under the “without reinsurance” curve in Figure 3 to 
the area under the “with reinsurance” curve.
Figure 3:  Probability distribution of claims costs with and without reinsurance
Source: Modified according to Harrington and Niehaus (2004: 90)
7  Insurers can use different types of reinsurance or their combinations, but usually non-life 
insurers require more reinsurance than life insurers. According to IAIS (2007: 16) the share 
of life insurance risks in 2006 was 24% while non-life insurance risks made the remaining 
share in total reinsurance premiums. Also, proportional reinsurance contracts are used more 
than non-proportional (International Association of Insurance Supervisors (2007), ‘Global 
Reinsurance Market Report 2007’, Basel, Switzerland). RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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Figure 3 clearly shows that if there is reinsurance the variation of real from 
expected losses will be lower and thus the need for capital for coverage of the 
deviations would be lower. In addition to this basic function of reinsurance, it 
has many other benefits to insurance companies and other stakeholders, such 
as financial stability and solvency protection, reduction in volatility of earnings 
or sudden fluctuations in the premium rate, reduction of loss of equity capital, 
reduction of the possibility of loss of job or regular tax payments, facilitates better 
compliance with regulatory constraints, enhance insurability, insurance products 
become less expensive, increase competitiveness and international spreading of 
risks, reduce capital costs and increase profitability and by lowering the necessary 
capital it facilitates opportunities for development of new markets and products. 
However, reinsurance has some drawbacks such as the need to renew cover as it 
is provided usually on an annual basis; the capacity is limited and volatile as are 
reinsurance premiums8 and having reinsurance cover means being exposed to 
the credit risk.9
The transfer of insurance risk from insurers to reinsurers is done through the 
global reinsurance market. The global nature of reinsurance market is one of its 
key specific characteristics. Reinsurance market is de facto secondary market for 
insurance risks and it may be seen, according to Rotar (2007: 565), as a market 
where commodities to be exchanged are risks. This market is highly concentrated10 
and for decades it was considered as adequately capitalised to offer additional 
protection  for  the  insurance  risks  coverage,  especially  for  the  catastrophic 
ones. However, due to increased frequency and severity of loss events in the last 
several years, and especially after Hurricane seasons of 2004 and 200511, which 
8  The volatility of reinsurance premiums is often characterised by cyclical nature of reinsurance, 
that is to say, reinsurance market continuously passes through phases of “soft” and “hard” 
market (Njegomir, 2006a). “Soft” market is the phase in reinsurance cycle when capacity is 
freely available, pricing is cheap and terms, conditions and exclusions are not rigidly enforced 
(Paine, 2004: 21).
9  Credit risk in reinsurance business is the risk of reinsurer default, or in other words, it is the 
risk that reinsurer will fail to pay the claims under a reinsurance contract.
10  At the beginning of the new millennium the group of 10 leading reinsurance companies 
accounted 60% of worldwide reinsurance premium, compared to 40% a decade earlier (Group 
of Thirty, 2006: 12), while in 2006 in property and casualty reinsurance market, 10 leading 
reinsurance companies had the market share of 54% (Benfield (2007), ‘Global Reinsurance 
Market Review: Pick ‘n’ Mix’, Benfield Group, London, p. 23).
11  According to IAIS (International Association of Insurance Supervisors (2007), p. 20) natural 
catastrophes are the most notable threat to the stability of the reinsurance industry as was 
illustrated by hurricane season of 2004 and 2005, which cost insurance industry $30 billion 
and $83 billion respectively. 64
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demonstrated how catastrophe events can endanger even the upper layers of 
reinsurance  coverage,  reinsurance  and  especially  the  retrocessional  capacity 
became limited due to the fact that large share of losses from these events have 
been cover by reinsurers (see Figure 4).
Figure 4:    Share of insured losses from the chosen  
catastrophic events paid by reinsurers
Source: Insurance Information Institute (2007).
Although these losses had the great impact on the availability of reinsurance 
and  retrocessional  coverage,  the  most  important  consequence  of  the  recent 
catastrophic  events  has  been  the  perception  change  in  relation  to  potential 
size of losses as well as the lowered risk appetite towards large risks (Njegomir, 
2006b: 69). As a result of combined effect of high reinsurance prices and limited 
availability of coverage and subsequent increased scrutiny in solvency regulation 
by supervisors and rating agencies, insurance and reinsurance companies rapidly 
started to search for alternative risk transfer solutions. However, it must be noted 
that some forms of alternative life and non-life insurance risk transfer solutions 
existed even before the new millennium, but the stated combined effect gave 
the impetus for exponential growth of new risk transfer solutions in the last few 
years. 
3.  ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS
The development of alternative risk transfer solutions is part of a bigger trend 
of convergence of insurance and capital markets. The word converge means 
“to come from different directions and meet at the same point to become one 
thing” (Longman, 2003: 343). That is exactly what is happening with insurance 
and capital markets. In addition to insurance risk transfer to capital markets, 
this trend encompass developments such as issuance of insurance contracts for RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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risks that has previously been managed by capital market instruments or selling 
of insurance contracts by banks, the process called bancassurance. In regard to 
alternative risk transfer solutions and gradual disappearance of demarcation 
lines between insurance and capital markets, the convergence is visible as it is 
no longer important, from a purely economic view, whether a certain product is 
formally insurance or reinsurance, or whether insurance solutions are combined 
with banking approaches to create a mixed product (Bock and Seitz, 2002: 4).
The most comprehensive definition of alternative risk transfer found states that 
“alternative risk transfer products are contracts, structures, or solutions provided 
by insurance and/or reinsurance companies that enable firms either to finance or 
to transfer some of the risks to which they are exposed in a nontraditional way, 
thereby functioning as synthetic debt or equity in a customer’s capital structure” 
(Culp, 2002: 352). Hence, alternative risk transfer (ART) is not a single product 
and can be described as a way of doing business (Hartwig and Wilkinson, 2007: 
925). The reason we use the term solutions rather than products or instruments 
is  because  ART  includes  alternative  carriers  (such  as  captives,  risk-retention 
groups and pools) and alternative products (such as finite risk reinsurance, run-
off solutions, committed or contingent capital, multi-line, multi-year products, 
multi-trigger programs, structured finance and new asset solutions, and capital 
market  solutions)  which  are  available  to  corporations  and  insurance  and 
reinsurance companies. However, our discussion on the role of alternative risk 
transfer solutions will be limited to the nontraditional12 solutions in insurance 
risk management utilised by insurance and reinsurance companies.
Although the history of application of alternative risk transfer solutions can be 
traced back to 1970’s13, the most important stimulus for their development, in 
relation to risk transfer to capital markets, was the capacity shortage of the global 
reinsurance and retrocession market during 1990’s and especially after Hurricane 
seasons of 2004 and 2005. In the last two decades these solutions pass through 
the transformational change from “the exciting idea” (Hengesbaugh, 1998: 119) 
through “the brave new world” (Laster and Raturi, 2001) to “mainstream” solution 
(McGhee et. al., 2008). 
12  These solutions are nontraditional in the sense that insurance risks are transferred, or in other 
words repacked and sold to capital market investors, in particular to institutional investors, 
instead to be transferred to traditional reinsurance or retrocession market.
13  The first ART forms were alternative carriers like captives and captive-like structures that 
were developed during 1970’s while the first form of alternative products, utilised by insurance 
companies, were life insurance securitisation developed during late 1980’s.66
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As  previously  mentioned,  the  capital  markets  have  come  to  be  seen  as  an 
alternative source of capacity for catastrophe protection, especially in the area of 
natural catastrophes. Securitisations, in particular, have been used by insurance 
and reinsurance companies in the circumstances of scarce capacity and high 
prices at reinsurance and retrocession markets.14 However, other factors such 
as  the  need  for  economic  value  maximisation,  taxes,  regulatory  constraints 
and deregulation of financial services industry contributed to the development 
of ART solutions. All mentioned factors contributed to the attractiveness of 
these new solutions to insurance and reinsurance companies, but the growth 
of ART solutions would not be of such pace if there was no interest from the 
investors,  who  saw  the  attractiveness  in  this  instruments  because  insurance 
risk  is  uncorrelated  with  other  risks  in  investors  portfolio,  thus  provide  the 
diversification benefit for investors and offers relatively high returns.15 Also, these 
solutions enable investors to invest in insurance risk and profit from it without 
the need to tie up their capital for a longer period, as it would be in the case of 
investment in insurance and reinsurance companies’ equities. Hence, investors 
participate only in sharing of insurance risks and not in sharing of all risks that 
insurance or reinsurance company is exposed to. These reasons, accompanied 
with advances in technology16, attracted more diverse investor base17 and were 
14  After Hurricane Katrina of 2005 majority share of new capital in 2005 and 2006 in insurance 
and reinsurance industry has been raised by recapitalisation and by the foundation of new 
companies despite the fact of the increasing role of ART solutions and especially cat bonds, 
which issuance doubled in 2006 in relation to 2005, while the majority share of new capital 
raised in 2007 was through utilisation of sidecars and cat bonds, which new issuance exceeded 
$7 billion and doubled in relation to 2006. Thus, even after Hurricane season of 2005, when 
they have marked the highest development, alternative risk transfer solutions have been used 
by insurers and reinsurers only as a supplement to traditional capacity. 
15  For example, the return on catastrophe bonds, measured as a spread over some reference 
rate such as LIBOR, has been reduced in 2007 (Benfield (2008), ‘Global Reinsurance Market 
Review: Changing the Game’, Benfield Group, London). However, in the period from June 2007 
to June 2008 Swiss Re’s BB-rated Cat Bond Total Return Index showed better performance 
than Lehman’s BB High Yield Corporate, which means that cat bonds offered investors better 
returns than corporate bonds in the period (GR, 2008: 68). This is particularly important as 
this period is characterised by the existence of financial crisis. 
16  On the basis of new technologies such as catastrophe models, mapping software, dynamic 
financial analysis, scenario testing and dynamic portfolio optimization investors that are 
not familiar with insurance risks as insurance and reinsurance companies are can easily get 
information on various types of natural disasters at a relatively low cost.
17  The leading investors in these solutions at their inception were insurance and reinsurance 
companies but in such circumstances it could not be said that ART market actually attracted 
very much new capital into the financing of catastrophic risk (Cummins, 2008). However, 
hedge  funds,  pension  funds,  money  market  funds,  investment  banks  and  dedicated 
catastrophe funds recently started investing in the market. RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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behind the increased interest of investors in ART solutions during the financial 
crisis of 2007 and 2008. Finally, it must be noted that the development of ART 
market was facilitated by the interest of intermediaries such as stock exchanges, 
investment banks and insurance and reinsurance brokers who found possibilities 
of new business opportunities.
The basic issue for insurance companies regarding utilisation of ART solutions 
is to compare them to traditional reinsurance and on the basis of cost/benefit 
analysis choose the right solution or combination of solutions that would best 
suit their needs. Both, reinsurance and ART solutions have certain advantages 
and disadvantages that need to be factored in when making such decisions (see 
Appendix 1). 
ART solutions have been primarily used for accounting and capital relief purposes 
by life insurance companies, thus they have been focused more on risk finance 
than risk transfer. In the field of non-life insurance ART solutions have been 
primarily used for financing peak catastrophe risks in conditions of scarce and 
expensive capacity. However, these solutions can offer insurance companies other 
benefits in addition to supplementary capital. Actually, their primary objective 
has been to increase insurability of risks. The main advantage of ART solutions 
in comparison to traditional reinsurance is the possibility of moral hazard and 
credit risk elimination, because by addressing these issues and offering coverage 
where traditional capacity is not available or is limited, they can increase limits 
of insurability. Moral hazard is present in insurance and reinsurance as they 
are indemnity based, which means that the indemnification is directly linked 
to actual losses what creates possibility, because of the information asymmetry 
between  buyers  and  sellers  of  coverage,  for  behavior  change  of  insureds  or 
insurers in sense that they can directly influence the underlying risks. By applying 
triggers that are not indemnity based, such as indexed or parametric, the moral 
hazard problem can be reduced or eliminated. Credit risk, that is inherent to 
traditional reinsurance, as explained above, can be avoided by collateralisation, 
which means that funds invested in risk-linked security are kept in collateral 
trust that serves as a guarantor for future contingent payments. Additionally, 
ART solutions can lower insurers’ and reinsurers’ costs by using indexes which 
facilitates avoidance of administrative costs related to loss handling, as there 
would only be need for index to reach certain attachment point (trigger) and thus 
there would not be need for the provement of losses, and by sharing acquisition 
costs with institutional investors, especially in life insurance. Also, they usually 
offer multi-year coverage thus helping reduction in volatility of coverage prices 
and avoidance of reinsurance market cycles. 68
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However,  the  ART  solutions  have  certain  disadvantages  as  they  are  usually 
complex to structure, time-consuming and expensive.18 The main issue, which 
concerns  insurance  and  reinsurance  companies  when  they  consider  ART 
solutions, is the presence of basis risk, the risk that coverage and losses will be 
mismatched, if trigger other than indemnity-based is used.19 Also, ART solutions 
are still not recognised by regulators and supervisors in relation to capital relief 
on the same footing as is reinsurance. However, the recent developments in 
regulation such as Solvency II project, which is designed to reward insurance 
companies, in the form of capital relief in the context of solvency regulation, for 
every kind of risk transfer as long as they can demonstrate that they understand 
the nature and limitations of the techniques used and that the real transfer exists 
and Reinsurance Directive, which gave the legitimacy to Special Purpose Vehicles 
that are necessary in structuring of risk securitisation transactions, will solve the 
problem and potentially will give additional impetus for the development of ART 
solutions.
Finally, when choosing adequate risk transfer solution(s) insurance companies 
need to consider the market conditions. Although it is reasonable to expect 
that insurance and reinsurance companies will use ART solutions only when 
reinsurance and retrocession capacity is limited and expensive, it is not really 
true, as the empirical evidence from 2007 and 2008 showed. Despite the soft 
reinsurance  market  insurance-linked  securities  maintained  the  interest  of 
investors but also insurance and reinsurance companies. Actually, insurers and 
reinsurers have followed the logic that even if one source of credit is slightly more 
expensive than another, a company might still access both just to be prepared 
for changing market conditions (Laster and Raturi, 2001: 15). In other words, 
insurers and reinsurers showed interest in maintaining relationships with capital 
market investors in order to be able, if market conditions harden, to transfer risks 
to them.
3.1  Securitisation – catastrophe bonds
Securitisation firstly appeared in the US during 1970’s in the form of monetisation 
of mortgages while in Europe it firstly appeared during 1980’s. Since then, until the 
credit crisis of 2007 that became financial crisis in 2008, there has been continuous 
18  For example, securitisations of insurance risks through bonds are still very expensive and 
they require about $100 million as a minimum volume to make them economically viable 
(Zeller, 2008).
19  For example, a Hurricane or other catastrophic event may not trigger the insurance-linked 
security although it can create substantial damages for insurer.RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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growth of these transactions in the US while growth in Europe continued even 
in 2007 despite the crisis (ESF, 2008). There are many different definitions of 
securitisation which are essentially similar as the fundamental purpose of the 
securitisation is transformation or monetisation of illiquid financial assets, such 
as credit, leasing and other receivables, into tradable securities. However, it is 
worth mentioning definition given by Schwarcz (1994) who links securitisation 
with  an  alchemy,  technique  used  by  medieval  chemists  to  turn  base  metals 
into gold, and explains that this alchemy really works as it enables companies 
to partly “deconstructs” themselves by separating certain types of highly liquid 
assets from the risks generally associated with the functioning of the company, 
and then using these assets to raise funds in the capital markets at a lower cost 
than would be the cost of raising funds by issuing more debt or equity. Securities 
that are “born” as a product of securitisation transaction are fully collateralised 
by assets, thus economic interest as well as associated risks in these assets are 
transferred to investors. 
In  insurance  business  securitisations  were  firstly  utilised  by  life  insurance 
companies during late 1980’s. These securitisations were not specific to insurance 
business  except  they  referred  to  monetisation  of  receivables  from  insurance 
contracts.  Essentially,  there  are  three  types  of  life  insurance  securitisations: 
securitisation of embedded value, reserve funding securitisation and insurance risk 
securitisation. The reasons for the development of securitisation in life insurance 
were more result of regulatory pressures and financial needs than problems with 
capacity shortages of reinsurance and retrocession market, although they allow 
insurance companies to hedge risks in addition to capital raising. Additionally, 
securitisation has the potential to improve market efficiency and capital utilisation 
thus enabling insurers to better compete with other financial institutions, increase 
return on equity and improve their operating performance (Cummins, 2004). As 
their mechanism is similar to mechanism used in catastrophe bond transactions 
they will not be discussed further.
Catastrophe bonds utilise securitisation in order to obtain additional capacity 
for insurance risk transfer in the circumstances of capacity shortage of the global 
reinsurance and retrocession market. Although the methods of securitisation 
of  receivables  are  implemented,  catastrophe  bonds  actually  represent  risk 
securitisation transactions that are intended to finance the risk transfer from 
the originator, typically insurance and reinsurance companies, and securities 
issuer, who is usually called Special Purpose Reinsurance Vehicle (SPRV). The 
goal of these transactions is not raising funds, as it is with other securitisations, 70
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but management of the insurable risk. Typical catastrophe bond transaction is 
shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5:  Mechanism of a typical catastrophe bond transaction
In a typical transaction of insurance risk transfer to the capital markets investors, 
insurance company as a transaction sponsor transfers assumed insurance risks 
from insureds to reinsurance company or directly to the SPRV, which has the 
role of retrocessionaire in the first case or reinsurer in the second. The coverage 
provided by bankruptcy remote20 SPRV is similar to quota-share, excess-of-loss 
reinsurance. The SPRV issues bonds that refers insurance risks and sell them to 
investors, thus it repackages untradeable insurance risks to tradable securities. 
The principal received and premiums are invested through the collateral trust, 
thus the coverage for insurance or reinsurance company is fully collateralised and 
thus credit risk is minimised. If needed the collateral trust can swap interest from 
investment acquired for an interest rate based on LIBOR increased for a spread. 
Insurance company acts as a servicer to investors as its obligation is to collect 
premiums from insureds and transfer them to the SPRV. Sometimes investors 
20  SPRV must be bankruptcy remote and not associated with the sponsoring insurance or 
reinsurance company. This means that the obligations of insurance companies other than 
those that originate from transferred insurance risks are not of investors’ interest. If insurer 
or reinsurer goes bankrupt the obligations of SPRV to investors will not be affected.RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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can seek credit enhancement, for example in the form of credit guarantees. If 
during the period of coverage the triggering event do not happen, investors will 
receive the principal invested increased with interest based on LIBOR plus spread. 
However, if triggering event does occur, the investors might lose the interest but 
sometimes the principal as well. 
The basic difference between catastrophe bonds, as securities linked to insurance 
risks, and other securities that are based on the financial assets are triggers that are 
used. Catastrophe bonds use four types of triggers: indemnity-based, modelled 
loss, industry loss indexes and parametric triggers. Indemnity-based triggers 
are based on actual insured losses experienced by the sponsoring insurance or 
reinsurance company. These triggers tend to be most favored by sponsors as the 
cover is most closely aligned to the actual catastrophic loss and hence the basis risk 
is minimal. Other three types of triggers have been more appealing to investors. 
These triggers include trigger that is based on modelled company losses, trigger 
that is based on industry loss indexes such as the Property Claim Services index, 
an indicator of catastrophe-related property losses products by Insurance Services 
Office, a New Jersey-based insurance data specialist, and parametric triggers 
where the payout from a bond to sponsors is based on a certain independent 
parameters, such as wind speed or the Richter scale for earthquakes.
Although  first  catastrophe  bonds  appeared  after  Hurricane  Andrew  of  1992 
and Northridge Earthquake of 1994, the wider acceptance these alternative risk 
transfer solutions gained after hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005.21 They offer 
insurance and reinsurance companies complementary capacity to traditional 
reinsurance and retrocession, especially for peak catastrophe risks.22 They also 
eliminate counterparty credit risk as they are fully collateralised, offer multi-
annual coverage that helps eliminates the unpredictability in available capacity 
and pricing that are inherent to each traditional reinsurance renewal season and 
has not only the potential for improvement of the overall balance sheet position, 
21  Their growth in the period from 2000 to 2007 was above 200% but the volume of transactions 
of larger value, those exceeding $200 million, significantly increased during 2006 and 2007 
(Klein, and Mooney, 2008) 
22  Catastrophe bonds are used for earthquake risk (for California, US Midwest, Japan, France 
and Monaco), hurricane risk (for US Northeast/Atlantic, US Golf coast, Puerto Rico, Hawaii 
and Japan) and for European windstorm and hailstorm risk (Banks, 2004: 124). Additionally, 
Australian wind/earthquake and Mexican earthquake were perils for which catastrophe bonds 
were first issued in 2006 (Klein, and Mooney, 2008). During 2007 catastrophe bond coverage 
expanded to include multiple perils as well as new risks such as European earthquake risk 
(Benfield (2008), ‘Global Reinsurance Market Review: Changing the Game’, Benfield Group, 
London).72
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but also helps in stabilisation of earnings and therefore in raising shareholder 
value. As is the case with other alternative risk transfer solutions, catastrophe 
bonds offer investors ability to invest in insurance risks that are uncorrelated 
with other risks in their portfolios and to gain additional, relatively high income. 
The main drawbacks of catastrophe bonds is the presence of basis risk in addition 
to illiquidity, high expenses, the need for a lot of analytical work and modelling 
which leads to relatively long periods of time for their establishment and in 
Europe in particular, their development was hindered by lack of appropriate 
indexes, such as Property Claims Services index in the US.
3.2  Contingent capital
Contingent capital is a pre-loss alternative risk transfer product that enables 
insurance or reinsurance company with the possibility to issue securities such as 
equities and bonds and structured securities such as catastrophe bonds. The word 
“contingent” is used to differentiate these structures from the paid-in capital, 
which understands classical meaning of capital that is available to insurance and 
reinsurance companies upon issuance of equities or bonds. Contingent capital 
is low-cost off-balance sheet alternative (Culp, 2002a) that provides conditional 
coverage upon the occurrence of some triggering insurable event. Figure 6 is 
included in order to provide better understanding of the difference between paid-
in and contingent capital by presenting their most simplified structures.
Figure 6:    The difference between paid-in and contingent capital  
on the example of put option on stocks
Source: Modified according to Munich Re (2001).RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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Paid-in  capital  structures  have  been  common  for  many  years  and  they  are 
usually utilised in order to raise capital by issuing securities for which insurance, 
reinsurance and other companies receive cash payments immediately after the 
completition of the transaction. Contingent capital structures, however, provide 
insurers and reinsurers with the right, but not the obligation, to issue specified 
security in the future at specified terms regarding price, triggering event and 
the time frame. For example, if the catastrophe happens during the period of 
option validity the insurer or reinsurer will have the right to sell securities to 
investors (option writers) at prices that are agreed in advance. The predetermined 
price  is  very  important  for  insurance  companies  as  after  the  occurrence  of 
catastrophic event it is usually very hard to obtain financial resources at prices 
that were prevailing before the occurrence of the triggering event and in addition, 
reinsurance and retrocession markets capacity becomes scarce and expensive. 
The costs of structuring contingent capital deals are much lower than are for 
catastrophe bonds as these deals are made through private placements (Culp, 2006) 
and usually the main cost is option fee paid to option writer at agreed intervals. 
Additional benefits of contingent capital include balance sheet protection when 
it is most needed and access to financing with neither a corresponding increase 
in leverage nor a dilution of shareholders’ equity (Benfield, 2008). However, due 
to the fact that they are usually structured as private placements, by utilising 
contingent capital structures insurers and reinsurers are exposed to the increased 
credit risk of the option writer.
The most widespread type of contingent capital structures utilised by insurance 
and  reinsurance  companies  are  catastrophe  equity  puts  (Cat-E-Puts).  The 
structure first developed by insurance and reinsurance broker Aon in the wake 
of  Hurricane  Andrew  and  the  Northridge  Earthquake  is  the  most  popular 
transaction format used mainly by reinsurers (Ehrhart, 2002). This puts enable 
insurers and reinsurers to raise capital by issuing equities at a pre-agreed price 
after the occurrence of the catastrophic event. However, due to the exposure to 
credit risk they haven’t attracted as much interest as catastrophe bonds.23 
3.3  Insurance Derivatives
Insurance derivatives are financial derivatives that are used for insurance risk 
hedging. In order to understand the mechanism of insurance derivatives it is 
important  to  briefly  explain  financial  derivatives.  The  broadestly  accepted 
23  For example, while cat bond issuance in 2007 reached $7 billion the total size of contingent 
capital deals reached $1.2 billion (ibid.).74
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definition of financial derivatives is given by the Group of Thirty (1993) according 
to which a derivatives transaction is a contract whose value depends on (or 
“derives” from) the value of an underlying asset, reference rate, or index. Financial 
derivatives firstly appeared during 1970’s and their origin was influenced by 
inflation pressures, high oil prices and breakdown of the Breton Woods system 
of monetary management that resulted in increased volatility of interest and 
exchange rates. Financial derivatives are essentially contracts that are traded at 
financial markets either through organised exchanges (futures and options) or at 
over the counter markets (forwards, options and swops).24 
As financial derivatives provided a good mechanism for interest and exchange 
rate  risk  hedging,  during  1990’s  the  similar  mechanism  is  implemented  for 
insurance risks. The basic difference of insurance derivatives is that they are 
derived from insurance risks rather than from typical financial market risks. 
Insurance derivatives enable insurance and reinsurance companies to transfer 
insurance  risks  to  capital  market  investors  and  serve  as  a  complement  to 
traditional reinsurance and retrocession while investors are offered additional 
opportunity to diversify risks in their portfolios. Additionally, investors can 
achieve supplementary returns by speculating on natural catastrophes (Doherty, 
2000).  Insurance  derivatives  include  futures,  options,  catastrophe  swaps  and 
industry loss warranties.
First insurance derivatives introduced by Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 
1992 were catastrophe insurance futures contracts. The values of these contracts 
were derived from the value of the index which was based on a loss ratio for 
the pool of 100 insurance companies in Insurance Services Office index (Lane, 
2006). In 1993 this exchange introduced options on these futures but because 
of insufficient interest both instruments were replaced with options based on 
Property  Casualty  Services  index,  which  measures  loss  instead  of  loss  ratio. 
However, these new instruments experienced the same fate as derivatives from 
1992 and 1993 and were delisted in 2000. Until 2007 there was no trading of 
24  Futures and forwards are contracts that obligate buyers and sellers to exchange specified assets 
at specified price at specified future date. The only difference is that futures are standardised 
while forwards are not. Swaps are most widespread financial derivatives and while also 
refer to future they enable contracting parties to exchange cash flows from specified assets 
instead of exchanging assets for specified price (Bank for International Settle ments, (2008), 
BIS Quarterly Reviews, Basel, Switzerland, http://www.bis.org/publ/quarterly.htm, accessed 
10 November 2008). Options are not standardised financial derivatives that provide option 
buyer with the right but not with the obligation to sell, in the case of put option, or to buy, in 
the case of call option, certain assets at specified price during specified time period. RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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insurance risks at exchanges. However, in 2007 the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and Chicago Climate Futures 
Exchange (CCFE) started trading with futures and options that refer catastrophe 
insurance risks (Benfield, 2008). Trading of futures and options25 on NYMEX 
is based on the same index that was used by CBOT in 1992 although now exist 
three separate indexes (National, Florida and Texas-Maine) that are calculated 
by dividing insured losses by $10 million. CME uses CME-Carvill hurricane 
index derived from hurricane risk in the US26 while CCFE uses index developed 
by Insurance Futures Exchange Services27. The advantages of exchange traded 
options and futures are transparency, standardisation, relatively low credit risk 
and the fact that the standard margin requirements are defined by exchange. 
However, due to the fact that these instruments are based on excessive modelling 
or historical loss records they are not best correlated with industry losses thus the 
basis risk is present. However, unlike to first attempts from 1990’s the insurance 
and reinsurance industry as well as investors expressed more interest in these 
instruments.28 Although the trading volume is still low it could be reasonable 
expected that in future these derivative instruments will have important role as a 
supplement to traditional reinsurance programmes.
Catastrophe swaps are insurance derivatives instruments that enable insurance 
and reinsurance companies to exchange two or more catastrophic risks. The risks 
25  Options are actually exchanged in the over-the-counter market but the clearing is done on 
NYMEX.
26  CME-Carvill hurricane index is actually a suite of products that covers five zones: eastern 
US coastline, Gulf coast, Florida, southern Atlantic (from Georgia to North Carolina) and 
northern Atlantic (from Virginia to Maine). The indexes are calculated by using publicly 
available information on maximum wind velocity and size of each storm provided by National 
Hurricane Center of the National Weather Service (Smith, S. (2008), An index to measure the 
destructive potential of hurricanes, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, http://www.cmegroup.com/
trading/weather/files/WEA_chi_whitepaper.pdf, accessed 05 November 2008). 
27  This index is used for trading of event linked futures that are modelled on Industry Loss 
Warranty reinsurance policies, but are contracts for difference, rather than reinsurance 
policies.  Initially  only  ‘First  Event’  contracts  were  listed  and  Second  Event  contracts 
were introduced on May 2 2008. On July 11 2008 IFEX (Insurance Futures Exchange Services 
website, http://www.theifex.com, accessed 05 November 2008) listed First and Second Event 
Tropical Wind event linked futures contracts for Florida and for the US Gulf Coast (the states 
of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas). 
28  While the total number of contracts that were traded at CBOT was below 20000, during the 
first seven months of 2008 there was 30000 contracts traded at CME (Risk and Insurance 
(2008), ‘Gustav’s ‘Live CAT’ Capacity’, Risk and Insurance magazine, LRP Publications, 
Horsham,  PA  http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=124326385,  accessed  20 
September 2008).76
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can be exchanged as a floating-for-floating swap contract, in which one reinsurer 
makes cash payments to another reinsurer following a triggering event in exchange 
for receiving LIBOR plus a spread, or they can be exchanged with one another 
(Lane, 2006). Figure 7 presents the example of catastrophe swap transaction when 
different catastrophe risks are exchanged between two companies.
Figure 7:    Example of catastrophe swap transaction between Japanese insurance 
company Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance and Switzerland-based reinsurer 
Swiss Re
Source: MSI (2003) 
In the shown transaction Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance company exchanged29 $50 
million of Japanese typhoon risk for $50 million North Atlantic hurricane risk 
and $50 million of Japanese typhoon risk for $50 million European windstorm 
risk. This transaction is done on parity basis which means that there was no 
exchange of money, although such swap transactions are also possible. Swap 
transactions helped these companies to reduce their peak exposures to certain 
risks and to diversify existing risks in their portfolios, thus freeing capital for new 
business acquisition or for regulatory purposes. In addition, because a risk swap 
transaction does not harm any existing profits of the swap counterparties, capital 
efficiency of both should improve (Takeda, 2002). Swap transactions are privately 
placed  transactions  what  makes  them  less  expensive  than  other  alternatives 
but also exposes counterparties to the credit risk of the other counterparty. 
Additionally,  as  they  are  based  on  excessive  modelling  basis  risk  is  present 
more than in some competitive solutions. However, the main problem for swap 
transactions is finding the right counterparty. With the aim to solve this problem 
the Catastrophe Risk Exchange was formed in 1994 in Princeton, New Jersey. It 
is actually a company with the main objective to facilitate parties in buying and 
selling reinsurance coverage and to transact reciprocal reinsurance swaps.
Another  important  development  in  the  field  of  insurance  derivatives  was 
industry loss warranties. Industry loss warranties, originated in London in the 
late 1980’s, are actually reinsurance contracts that have two triggers. The first is 
29  Each party respectively ceded and assumed specific catastrophe reinsurance contract(s) to/
from the other party.RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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indemnity trigger that is based on the losses that buying insurance or reinsurance 
company experience and the second is warranty trigger that is based on losses 
experienced by the whole insurance industry. All triggers must be hit in order 
for industry loss warranty to pay off its buyers for specified catastrophe event in 
specific geographic region. Because of the retention of the first trigger industry 
loss warranties have regulatory treatment as reinsurance contracts, what makes 
them appealing for insurance and reinsurance industry participants. Although 
industry loss warranties are exercised as private transactions (Benfield, 2008) and 
thus the limitation of reliable data on utilisation of these instruments exists, there 
are estimates that in 2007 the total market value of these instruments exceeds $4 
billion (Pennay, 2007:3) and even $7 billion (Wheeler and Janeke, 2008: 4). Despite 
the fact that the basis risk is present, which is certainly one of the main concerns 
for insurers and reinsurers, the main obstacle to their development in Europe has 
been the lack of reliable and independent industry loss index. Although Swiss 
Re and Munich Re had developed two loss indexes they are not widely accepted 
because insurance industry participants associate them with exposure to basis 
risk and found them biased and of limited geographic spread (Benfield, 2008). 
In order to solve this problem, Swiss Re, Munich Re, AXA, Zurich Financial 
Services and Allianz started initiative for the development of independent body 
that will create reliable European loss index such as that of Insurance Services 
Office in the US. 
3.4  Reinsurance sidecars
Sidecars30 are alternative risk transfer solutions which have similarities to cat 
bonds and traditional reinsurance and can be used as a supplement to both. 
Although  the  similar  structures  existed  for  several  years  before,31  the  true 
enthusiasm for them was expressed after hurricane season of 2005. During 2006 
$3.6 billion of equity and loan capital was raised through sidecars to support 
mainly North American catastrophe risk (Benfield, 2007), while in 2007 only 
around $1.15 billion of new capital has been raised through sidecars (Benfield, 
2008).  Although  they  also  marked  significant  presence  in  2008  (Klein  and 
Mooney, 2008) it is estimated that the interest for them is decreasing because 
of the currently present “soft” reinsurance market. However, because of their 
30  Sidecars are small vehicles attached to the side of a motorcycle, in which a passenger can ride 
(Longman, 2003: 1532). In the sense of their application in insurance and reinsurance the 
term “sidecars” is used to describe that these vehicles are used as off-balance sheet solution. 
31  The existence of sidecars can be traced back to 1999 when State Farm and Renaissance Re 
formed joint venture which lead to the formation of Top Layer in order to provide high layer, 
catastrophic property coverage for RenRe’s portfolio of property programs.78
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advantages in providing additional capacity, they would probably be a viable 
alternative when the reinsurance market hardens again.
A.M.  Best  (2006)  defines  them  as  limited-life  special  purpose  entities  that 
generally provide property catastrophe quota-share reinsurance exclusively to its 
sponsor. This definition suggests that they have limited lifetimes32 in the sense 
that they serve to fulfill the specific reinsurance needs to the sponsor. They are 
usually used with the aim to provide additional retrocession capacity on a short-
term basis for property or marine risks, although some sidecars have been used 
for the life/health risks. Usually the structure of sidecars is based on a quota-
share reinsurance. The simplified sidecar structure is shown by Figure 8.
Figure 8:  Simplified sidecar structure
Source: A.M. Best (2006)
Figure 8 shows that sidecar is actually a holding company, usually found at 
Bermuda, which issues debt and equities to investors and colateralises full amount 
of the ceded limit with the trust account. Sidecars provide reinsurers with the 
possibility to underwrite more risks than their balance sheet capital would allow 
but without the treat that their credit rating will be endangered33, as some of peak 
risks are transferred off-balance sheet. In addition to fully collateralised coverage 
32  Because of their limited lifetimes they are also called “disposable reinsurers”.
33  However, there are concerns of rating agencies that when they are written on an ultimate net 
loss basis, some of the risks for which it was supposed that are transferred to the sidecar can 
actually be borne by the sponsoring reinsurer (Benfield Group (2007), Global Reinsurance 
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that minimises credit risk to the sponsoring reinsurance company, sidecars are 
attractive to reinsurers as there is no need to disclose information (Klein and 
Mooney, 2008) such is needed in a typical retrocession transaction. Because of 
the simplicity of their structure (see Figure 8 and Figure 5) in comparison to 
catastrophe bonds they are less time-consuming and the costs are lower than the 
costs of traditional reinsurance, debt or equity financing or establishment of new 
reinsurance companies.
Sidecars as other alternative risk transfer solutions could not be developed if there 
was no interest from investors such as hedge funds and private equity investors. 
The main attraction of sidecars to investors is that they allow investments in 
insurance-linked risks without the need to take on long-term investment risk, 
the problem associated with the establishment of a reinsurance company. Also, 
in comparison to traditional investment in establishment of a new reinsurance 
companies sidecars provide the advantage of easy entrance and exit. In other 
words, sidecars provide easy entrance to the market during the “hard” and the 
easy exit during the “soft” phase of reinsurance market cycle. Additionally, they 
enable investors to diversify their portfolios with insurance risks, as they can 
with catastrophe bonds, but unlike catastrophe bonds sidecars are simpler to 
understand as they are, from investors’ point of view, very similar to traditional 
investments in equity and debt securities.
4.    CURRENT STATE OF RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS IN  
THE SERBIAN INSURANCE MARKET
Although some embryonic forms of risk sharing existed before34, the development 
of insurance business in Serbia started in 1868 with the establishment of first 
insurance  companies  Gresom  and  Anker,  which  were  in  foreign  ownership. 
First insurance companies established with majority share of domestic capital 
were Beogradska zadruga and Srbija (Marović, 2001: 7) After the Second World 
War insurance industry passed through the all development phases of economic 
and social system of former socialist Yugoslavia. The worst period in domestic 
insurance history has been the period of hyperinflation that destroyed insurance 
companies’ funds that combined with irregularities in the functioning of insurance 
companies resulted in a loss of confidence in insurance. The consequence of such 
34  The traces of primitive forms of insurance in Serbia can be found in Dusan’s Code of 1349.80
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developments  was  currently  undeveloped  insurance  market.35  Only  after  the 
introduction of the new insurance law in 2004 insurance and partially restored 
confidence in the insurance industry, market started to develop. However, despite 
the increased development in recent years, the market is still undeveloped because 
of slow overall economic development.
While the first idea for the establishment of state-dominated reinsurance company 
was born in 1940 (Kočović and Šulejić, 2002: 15), until 1977 there was no any 
professional reinsurer, although coinsurance as a way of spreading the same risks 
between insurance companies existed.36 In 1977 the first professional reinsurance 
company Dunav Re was established and this marked the beginning of reinsurance 
operations in Serbia. Nowadays reinsurance market in Serbia is represented by 
three reinsurance companies, Novi Sad Re, established in 1980, and Delta Re in 
addition to Dunav Re. The market is highly concentrated as the leading reinsurer 
Dunav Re has a market share of over 70%. Although there are no reliable data on 
the functioning of reinsurance companies, from the data37 found at insurance 
companies’ balance sheets it can be assumed that approximately 10% of direct 
insurers’ premium is transferred to reinsurers while a great part of the accepted 
premiums in reinsurance is transferred to global reinsurance market. In this way, 
national reinsurers actually collect small risks from local insurance companies 
and then repackage them into an offer with premium volumes that are attractive to 
global reinsurers. The reason of such protected position of reinsurance companies 
is the insurance law (Insurance Law, 2004, Article 15) which made it obligatory to 
insurance companies to reinsure with domestic reinsurance companies. However, 
International Monetary Fund had recommended to National Bank of Serbia to 
phase out restrictive trade practices regarding mandatory reinsurance cessions 
35  The share of total premium in GDP in 2007 was just 2.04%, much lower than the EU average 
of 9% while the total insurance premium per capita was about $103, which is fairly enough 
when we know that the average salary was approximately $400, but is too low in comparison 
to regional average of between $300 and $1000 of premium per capita. Additionally, measured 
by the total premium volume of $766 million in 2007, Serbian insurance market’s share in 
total world premium was 0.02% , despite the achieved real growth of 8.2% (Staib, D. and L. 
Bevere (2008), ‘World insurance in 2007: emerging markets leading the way’, Sigma No 3, 
Swiss Re, Zurich) 
36  For example, the Yugoslav oil pipeline in Rijeka was coinsured from fire and associated perils 
by three insurance companies: Croatia, Sarajevo and Vojvodina with 50%, 32% and 18% of 
share in risk coverage respectively (Marović, 2001: 291).
37  The share of earned net premium in earned premium for the period from 2004 to 2007 ranged 
between 90% and 92% for non-life and 99% for life insurance (National Bank of Serbia (2008), 
Insurance  Companies  Operations,  http://www.nbs.rs/export/internet/cirilica/60/60_2/index.
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and long-term property insurance contracts (IMF, 2006: 43). Additionally, when 
Serbia becomes member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)38, the solid 
position of domestic reinsurance companies will be lost, as the experience of 
other Eastern European companies has shown. It is expected that with opening 
of the domestic reinsurance market the only competitive advantage for domestic 
over foreign reinsurers will be their experience in the local insurance business 
and their ability to reduce their administrative expenses.
From the brief description of the reinsurance market it is clear that reinsurance 
is the only39 and by Insurance law obligatory risk transfer solution for domestic 
insurance companies. Currently, Serbian insurance industry lacks of even legal 
basis for the development of capital market solutions for insurance risk transfer. 
But besides the current insurance law incomprehensiveness in regard to range 
of legally accepted insurance risk transfer solutions and undeveloped insurance 
market40, the underdevelopment of capital market and the absence of catastrophic 
events are additional factors that hindered the development of capital market 
solutions. 
Currently, Serbian capital market is represented by the trades that take place 
at  the  Belgrade  Stock  Exchange  as  over-the-counter  market  does  not  exist. 
Although  the  stock  exchange  has  been  established  before  the  Second  World 
War, in the period after the war it was closed until 1989, but the trading actually 
started after 2000 when privatisation process began and when restricted foreign 
currency public saving bonds were issued by the Serbian government. Although 
recently there has been an increase in the number and value of transactions41, the 
38  Serbia is in negotiation for WTO membership from 2005.
39  Although the Insurance Law (2004) provide legislative basis for the existence of risk sharing 
through coinsurance in addition to reinsurance, the only risk transfer mechanism exercised 
in practice by domestic insurers is reinsurance.
40  The opinion of the authors is that undeveloped insurance market has led Serbian insurance 
companies to form opinion that they cannot do anything in order to hedge against the 
reinsurance market cycles. The rational behind such development has been the low share of 
Serbian insurance market in the world’s total premium, which limited domestic reinsurers’ 
contractual position in relation to the possibility of changing conditions that are determined 
in advance. 
41  In the period from 2004 to 2007the total number of transactions rose by 113% and the total 
volume of transactions rose by 307% (Belgrade Stock Exchange, 2008).82
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market currently lacks of wider investor base42 and wider diversity of investment 
instruments available.43 
Finally, we have seen that the most important stimulus for the development 
of alternative risk transfer solutions were catastrophic events. The absence of 
catastrophic events in Serbia in recent years, although generally positive trend, 
had negative impact on the need of insurance companies to search for alternative 
sources of capacity. Additionally, because of low insurance penetration, large 
catastrophic events, even when they did occur44, were not born by insurance 
companies but were compensated from public funds formed on the basis of social 
solidarity principles. 
5.    EXPECTED FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF  
RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS IN SERBIA 
Currently, insurance companies in Serbia lack of the opportunities of transferring 
insurance risk to capital markets as the only relationship between insurance 
and  capital  markets  have  been  through  investment  operations  of  insurance 
companies  and  direct  investments  of  capital  markets  investors  in  shares  of 
insurance  companies.  However,  in  order  to  improve  efficiency  of  risk  and 
capital management and to make use of other advantages, which are confirmed 
in developed insurance markets, it would be desirable for domestic insurance 
companies to develop solutions that would enable transfer of insurance risks to 
capital markets in addition to traditional transfer to reinsurance market. 
The general fact is that economic progress has direct impact on the rise of capital 
stocks and property values in economy and the level of people’s consciousness 
about the importance of insurance protection. Additionally, the experience of 
developed economies and economies that have passed through the changes from 
administrative to market economy clearly shows that with increased economic 
development  the  frequency  and  especially  severity  of  loss  events  becomes 
42  Although new laws on investment and pension funds provide the legal basis and had led to 
the establishment of these institutions, even under these new legislations the establishment of 
hedge funds, so important to the development of capital market solutions for insurance risk 
transfer, is not anticipated. 
43  Although in 2004 several transactions with corporate bonds and commercial papers were 
recorded, only available instruments in 2005, 2006 and 2007 were shares and restricted 
foreign currency public saving bonds (Belgrade Stock Exchange, 2008).
44  For example, Montenegrin earthquake of 1979 or Serbian floods of 2006.RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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greater as well as the volume of available income that can be used for insurance 
protection.  Thus,  the  economic  development  leads  to  increased  demand  for 
insurance, but as the experience of developed market shows, usually the pace 
of this increase is faster than that of the capacity of insurance and reinsurance 
industry. Thus, it is obvious that the level of economic development, that could be 
expected to significantly increase in Serbia in the long-run, will lead to increased 
need for additional sources of capacity. On the other hand, the development of 
insurance market leads to increased competition, as it has been seen recently 
in Serbia45, which further leads to increased pressures on capital of insurance 
companies, as more money needs to be invested in the market development and 
acquiring new customers. Combined with the increased insurance penetration 
that leads to greater loss exposures of insurance companies, this would lead to 
increased pressures on insurance companies’ solvency margins and thus the need 
for alternative risk transfer solutions from insurance companies in Serbia can be 
expected. Finally, the development of ART solutions is inconceivable without the 
developed capital market. If Serbian capital market continue to develop at the 
pace that was noted in the last four years, it is reasonable to expect that it would 
become one of the major impetuses for the development of ART solutions.
However, we argue that alternative risk transfer solutions, which provide transfer 
of insurance risks to capital market investors, have two-way relationships with the 
level of development of insurance and capital markets as well as with the level of 
overall economic development (see Figure 9). By providing the additional capacity 
and more efficient capital utilisation they would enable insurance companies to 
offer better coverage conditions and price stability which would directly lead 
to increased development of insurance operations in Serbia. Additionally, the 
development of ART solutions in Serbia would facilitate the development of 
domestic capital market, as the subsequently greater variety of available financial 
instruments  would  improve  risk  diversification  possibilities,  which  would 
consequently provide basis for the increased attractiveness of greater number of 
investors from the country and abroad. The positive effects on the development 
of insurance and capital market would facilitate the overall economic growth, 
which would in turn facilitate further development of insurance and capital 
markets and ART solutions. 
45  From November of 2007 when DDOR Novi Sad, the second largest insurance company in 
Serbia, was privatised, Serbian insurance industry is in majority ownership of foreign capital 
(National Bank of Serbia (2008), Insurance Companies Operations, Belgrade, http://www.nbs.
rs/export/internet/cirilica/60/60_2/index.html, accessed 12 November 2008).84
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Figure 9:    The simplified two-way relationship between ART solutions on one side 
and insurance and capital markets and overall economic development 
on the other 
However, in order to facilitate the development of ART solutions it will be needed, 
in addition to changes in economic factors, to provide the legal basis for their 
development. One of the positive signs in this regard has been the development of 
the draft of the Law on Securitisation that will provide, if adopted, the legal basis 
for the securitization of receivables. When this happens, as the experience of 
developed economies shows, the basis for the development of risk securitisations 
will be provided. However, the most important change would be the change in 
the way how insurance and reinsurance companies’ solvency is regulated, which 
means that the modified insurance law would have to provide the capital relief for 
ART solutions on the same footing as for coinsurance and reinsurance. Although 
we expect that reinsurance will retain the leading role as a risk transfer solution 
in the future of Serbian insurance market, the mentioned changes will certainly 
be made within the total efforts of making Serbia closer to the EU membership.
6.  CONCLUSION 
Risk  transfer  solutions  that  are  available  to  contemporary  global  insurance 
companies  encompass  traditional  reinsurance  and  alternative  risk  transfer 
solutions, which are one of the results of the long-term trend of convergence of 
insurance and capital markets. It could be expected, by extrapolating the past 
developments, that in the future the role of alternative risk transfer solutions 
will be increased because of the increased interest of insurers and reinsurers, as RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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there is continuous discrepancy between the demand and supply of insurance 
and reinsurance cover caused by slower growth of capacity in relation to growth 
of risk exposures, and capital market investors, who can achieve relatively high 
returns combined with proved diversification effect. Additionally, it is reasonable 
to expect that alternative risk transfer solutions will be utilised not only for 
catastrophe risks but also for non-catastrophe risks, such as further development 
of already implemented solutions for the motor and liability insurance risks. 
In support to the conclusion of growing importance of alternative risk transfer 
solutions is the fact that in 2007 and 2008, despite the financial crisis46 and “soft” 
reinsurance  market,  there  was  continued  growth  of  interest  from  investors, 
although  there  was  slight  decrease  of  interest  from  insurers  and  reinsurers. 
However, in order to compete effectively with reinsurance, especially in the “soft” 
phase of reinsurance cycle, some fundamental issues, such as still relatively high 
transaction costs in comparison to reinsurance, the need to obtain capital relief 
on an equal footing as for reinsurance from regulators and rating agencies, lack of 
liquidity, transparency, standardisation, reliable industry loss data and indexes in 
Europe, expertise and insurance risk diversity, still need to be fully addressed.
On the basis of the mechanisms that underlie the functioning of reinsurance 
and alternative risk transfer solutions, explained in the paper, we can draw the 
conclusion that these solutions are complementary, although the term “alternative” 
is used for the risk transfer solutions other than traditional reinsurance. The 
fact that alternative risk transfer solutions have been used mainly in the field 
of catastrophic risks in the conditions of limited reinsurance and retrocession 
capacity and high premiums as a supplementary method to this capacity goes 
in support for this conclusion. Additional fact that support this conclusion is 
that insurers and reinsurers make their decisions in relation to the choice of 
traditional and/or alternative risk transfer solutions in the same way as they made 
them in relation to the choice of risk retention and/or transfer, that is to say, they 
made these decisions on the basis of the analysis of costs and benefits of different 
available alternatives in addition to having factored in objectives that they aim to 
achieve, their size, risk tolerance and other specific characteristics. For example, 
if the relatively small insurer has the aim to achieve wider annual cover with the 
possibility of coverage renewal and relatively lower costs in “soft” reinsurance and 
retrocession market, with accepting credit risk but without accepting basis risk, 
the priority would certainly be given to reinsurance. Different preferences would 
46  One of the effects of the financial crisis was the collapse of investment bank Lehman Brothers 
that was guarantor in several catastrophe bond transactions, which consequently marked 
decrease in credit rating.86
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Appendix 1
Table A1:  Comparison of capital market instruments with reinsurance
 
Cat bonds/swaps Exchange traded 
options
Contingent 
capital
Property 
catastrophe  
reinsurance
Compensation/ 
financing
Compensates 
buyer 
against losses, 
subject 
to basis risk
Compensates 
buyer 
against losses, 
subject to basis risk
Provides 
financing on 
pre-agreed terms 
in 
case of loss 
event.  
No 
indemnification
Compensates 
reinsured 
against losses
Basis risk Present in deals 
with 
trigger based on 
index
Significant Depends on the 
index/trigger 
used
Minimal
Credit risk Minimal. 
Capital is  
invested in safe 
securities held 
by 
trustee
Minimal. 
Obligations 
guaranteed by the  
exchange
Minimal. 
Capital is 
invested in safe 
securities held 
by 
trustee
Depends on 
solvency 
of the reinsurer
Liquidity for  
risk taker
Currently low.  
Expected to 
improve 
as market 
develops.
Currently low. 
Expected 
to improve as 
market 
develops
Low Limited to 
retrocession 
market
Well-established 
underwriting  
accounting 
rules?
Yes No No Yes
Well-established 
accounting rules  
for investors?
Yes Yes No Yes
Standardisation Customised Standardised Customised Customised
Multiyear 
pricing
Available No Available Availability 
depends on  
market conditions
Transaction 
costs 
relative to  
reinsurance
High, expected 
to  
decrease as firms 
gain experience
Low High, expected 
to 
decrease as firms 
gain experience
N/A
Source: Laster and Raturi (2001)